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Data-sharing systems—where healthcare providers jointly implement a common reporting system to 
promote voluntary reporting, information sharing, and learning—are emerging as an important 
regional, state-level, and national strategy for improving patient safety.  The objective of this chapter 
is to review the evidence regarding the effectiveness of these data-sharing systems and to report on the 
results of an analysis of data from the Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare Initiative (PRHI).  PRHI 
consists of 42 hospitals, purchasers and insurers in southwestern Pennsylvania that implemented 
Medmarx, an on-line medication error reporting systems. Analysis of data from the PRHI hospitals 
indicated that the number of errors and corrective actions reported initially varied widely with 
organizational characteristics such as hospital size, JCAHO accreditation score and teaching status.  
But the subsequent trends in reporting errors and reporting actions were different. Whereas the 
number of reported errors increased significantly, and at similar rates, across the participating 
hospitals, the number of corrective actions reported per error remained mostly unchanged over the 12 
month period. A computer simulation model was developed to explore organizational changes 
designed to improve patient safety.  Four intervent ions were simulated involving the implementation of 
computerized physician order entry, decision support systems and a clinical pharmacist on hospital 
rounds.   The results of this study carry implications for the design and assessment of data-sharing 
systems. Improvements in patient safety require more than voluntary reporting and clinical initiatives.  
Organizational changes are essential in order to significantly reduce medical errors and adverse 
events.    
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Patient Safety 
For more than a decade studies in the U.S. (Brennan et al., 1991; Leape et al., 1991; Gawande 
et al., 1999; Thomas et al., 2000) and other countries (Wilson et al, 1995; Vincent et al., 1999; Davis et 
al., 2002, 2003; Baker et al., 2004; WHO, 2004) have reported that adverse events in health care are a 
major problem.  These studies estimate that anywhere from 3.2% to 16.6% of hospitalized patients in 
the U.S. and Australia respectively experience an adverse event while hospitalized.  A recent Canadian 
study of hospital patients estimated a rate of 7.5 adverse events per 100 hospital admissions (Baker et 
al., 2004).  Over 70% 0f these patients experience disability and 14% die as a result of the adverse 
event.  The Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, To Err is Human:  Building a Safer Health System 
(Kohn, Corrigaan & Donaldson, 2001), estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths occur in the 
U.S. each year as a result of medical errors.  In fact, there is evidence that morbidity and mortality 
from medical errors increased between 1983 and 1998 by 243% (Phillips & Bredder, 2002).   
A significant number of these errors involve medications.  A meta-analysis of 39 prospective 
studies indicated that adverse drug reactions from medication errors account for a significant 
proportion of these events in the U.S. (Lazarou, Pomeranz & Corey, 1998).  One study of medication 
errors in 36 hospitals and skilled nursing facilities in Georgia and Colorado found that 19% of the 
doses were in error; seven percent of the errors could have resulted in adverse drug events (ADEs) 
(Barker et al., 2002)).  ADEs also occur among outpatients at an estimated rate of 5.5 per 100 patients.  
A recent analysis of hospital emergency departments in the U.S., estimated that ADEs account for 2.4 
out of every 1000 visits (Budnitz et al., 1006).  Based on these studies the Institute of Medicine 
recommended that confidential voluntary reporting systems be adopted in all health care organizations  
(IOM, 2001).   
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 Traditionally efforts to reduce errors have focused on training, rules and sanctions.  Also, 
hospitals have relied on voluntary reporting of errors.  Currently only 5-10% of medication errors that 
result in harm to patients are reported (Cullen et al., 1995).  As a result little progress has been made 
since the IOM report five years ago (Leape & Berwick, 2005).   
Data Sharing Systems  
Studies have indicated that adverse events in health care settings primarily result from 
deficiencies in system design (Anderson, 2003).  A study of adverse drug events in Utah and Colorado 
estimated that 75% of ADEs were attributable to system failures (Gawande et al., 1999; Thomas et al., 
2000).  Consequently, there is growing consensus that improvements in patient safety require 
prevention efforts, prompt reporting of errors, root-cause-analysis to learn from these errors and 
system changes to prevent the errors from reoccurring.   
Currently only 5-10% of medical errors are reported (Cullen et al., 1995).  Incident reporting 
represents a major strategy to address growing concerns about the prevalence of errors in healthcare 
delivery (Billings, 1998).  The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act was signed into law in 
2005.  This act encourages health care providers to report medical errors to patient safety organizations 
that are being created.  Patient safety organizations are authorized to analyze data on medical errors, 
determine causes of the errors, and to disseminate evidence-based information to providers to improve 
patient safety.  Currently, over 24 states have mandated some form of incident reporting (Comden & 
Rosenthal, 2002).  Also, there has been a steady increase in the number of regional coalitions of 
providers, payers, and employers working to improve patient safety (Halamka et al., 2005).  These 
efforts are driven by the premise that the identification of unsafe conditions is an essential first step 
toward analyzing and remedying the root causes of errors. Such reporting systems often occur in the 
context of an infrastructure for inter-organizational sharing of these data. The emphasis on data-
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sharing is based on the premise that when organizations share such data about incidents and the 
lessons learned from them, it will lead to accelerated improvements in patient safety across the board. 
In other words, data-sharing is expected to result in community-wide learning. Indeed, patient safety 
centers in states that have created them are charged with facilitating such data-sharing.  Not 
surprisingly, these data-sharing systems vary widely.  They differ in the data that is shared (from 
specific processes/outcomes such as medication errors and/or nosocomial infections to a broad range 
of incidents); the participants (individual clinicians to entire healthcare organizations); geography 
(regional, state, and national); technology (paper-based to online); and regulatory expectations about 
participation (voluntary or mandatory) (Rosenthal et al., 2004; Flowers & Riley, 2001).  
Despite such differences, data-sharing systems are typically based on the premise that threats to 
patient safety arise from the unwillingness/discomfort of healthcare providers to openly discuss errors 
and their resulting lack of awareness of the magnitude of the problem.  The identification and 
reporting of unsafe conditions is a necessary first step in a systemic approach to revamping patient 
safety.  But technological, psychological, cultural, legal, and organizational challenges pose 
formidable barriers to the blame-free identification and discussion of unsafe conditions.  Whereas 
individual organizations by themselves may not be able to take on these challenges, participation in a 
data-sharing coalition provides a shared rationale and the subtle benefits of peer influence. Second, the 
data from increased reporting facilitates the diagnosis of systemic causes of unsafe conditions and the 
implementation of systemic solutions. So data-sharing, it is assumed, will accelerate the identification 
of unsafe conditions, encourage analysis of the underlying causes, and enable continuous process 
improvement. Although different organizations may benefit differently from participating in a data-
sharing system, a strong implicit assumption underlying these systems is that they will benefit the 
entire community of participating organizations. 
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To date few studies have examined the anticipated benefits of medical error data-sharing 
systems.  Below we report the results of a study of developmental trends in two indicators of the 
effectiveness of one regional data-sharing coalition.  The indicators are the reported number of 
medication errors and the number of corrective actions taken by hospitals as a result of these errors.  
The objectives of the study were to examine whether hospitals that participated in medication error 
data-sharing consortium experienced increased reporting over time.  The second objective was to 
determine whether error reporting resulted in organizational actions aimed at reducing future errors.  A 
third objective was to explore organizational interventions designed to reduce mediation errors in 
hospitals.       
The Pittsburgh Regional Healthcare Initiative (PRHI) 
A consortium of providers, purchasers, insurers and other stakeholders in healthcare delivery in 
southwestern Pennsylvania  was formed in 1997 (Siro et al., 2003).  Its purpose was to improve patient 
care by working collaboratively, sharing information about care processes and their links to patient 
outcomes, and using patient-centered methods and interventions to identify rapidly solve problems to 
root cause at the point of care.  Clinicians, 42 hospitals, four major insurers, several large and small-
business healthcare purchasers, corporate and civic leaders, and elected officials  make up the 
consortium.  
In order to improve clinical practice and patient safety PRHI created a regional infrastructure 
for common reporting and shared learning.  The consortium focuses on two patient safety goals, 
reducing nosocomial or hospital acquired infections and medication errors. 
The organizational learning model that underlies the PRHI strategy is based on the science of 
complex adaptive systems (Plsek, 2001).  Healthcare delivery systems are viewed as a collection of 
individual agents whose actions are not always predictable.  At the same time agents are 
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interconnected so that the actions of one agent can change the organizational context for other agents.  
Accordingly sustainable system-wide improvements in patient safety require real-time error reporting 
and decentralized problem solving.  PRHI has relied on several strategies to promote improvements. 
The system chosen for reporting of medication errors was the USP’s Medmarx (Hicks et al., 2004) .  
The system standardizes medication error reporting by using the national coordinating council for 
medication error reporting and prevention (NCCMERP) error categories.  The Medmarx system is 
anonymous and voluntary.  Health care providers can report medication errors online using a 
standardized format.  The following information is collected on each reported order: 
(1) Inpatient or outpatient setting 
(2) Type of error 
(3) Severity 
(4) Cause of error 
(5) Location 
(6) Staff and products involved 
(7) Contributing factors 
(8) Corrective actions taken 
Data reported by consortium members is analyzed and quarterly reports are provided to 
participating hospitals.  These reports contain facility-specific regional and national data.  The 
quarterly reports provided data on reporting volume reflecting the early strategic emphasis on 
increasing reporting.  The reports also contain data on the corrective actions being reported by each 
hospital.  These reports provided an opportunity to compare the trends in reporting of errors with 
reporting of corrective actions.  It was hypothesized that growth in the reporting of medication errors 
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reported through the data sharing system would predict growth in corrective actions taken by the  
hospitals in response to the reported errors.   
Effectiveness of Data Sharing 
We set out to examine the effects of data-sharing on the group of participating hospitals. The 
data analyzed consisted of approximately 17,000 reports of medication errors submitted over a 12 
month period by 25 hospitals that are participating in PRHI.  There were two outcome variables: the 
number of medication errors reported by each hospital each quarter and the ratio of corrective actions 
reported by each hospital to the number of errors reported each quarter.  Control variables included the 
hospital’s teaching status (i.e., teaching versus non-teaching), the hospital size in terms of the number 
of beds, and the latest JCAHO accreditation score. A latent growth curve analysis was used to examine 
longitudinal trends in error reporting and organizational corrective actions (Anderson et al., 2007).  
This analysis permitted the investigators to determine whether statistically significant changes in error 
reporting and corrective actions occurred over time; whether these trends varied significantly among 
the hospitals; and whether hospital characteristics were associated with these trends. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of medication errors reported by severity.  Fifty one percent of 
the events had the capacity to cause harm but did not affect the patient. Another 41% of the errors 
reached the patient but did not cause harm. The remaining medication errors caused patient harm and 
in two cases may have resulted in the patient’s death.    
Figure 2 shows the trends in error reporting and corrective actions over the four quarters. 
During the first quarter hospitals reported on average 45 medication errors. The number of errors 
reported rose steadily and had almost doubled by the fourth quarter. In contrast, the number of 
corrective actions taken by the hospitals in response to the errors remained fairly constant and, in fact, 
decreased slightly by the fourth quarter. 
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Furthermore, our analysis indicated that, although there were significant differences between 
hospitals in error reporting at the baseline, subsequent error reporting increased at similar rates among 
the hospitals. By contrast, while there were significant differences among hospitals in their base line 
reporting of corrective actions, the number of corrective actions reported per error remained 
unchanged during subsequent quarters.  The finding that the increase in reporting rates were similar 
across participating hospitals is consistent with the notion that data-sharing provides opportunities for 
organizations to observe others’ actions and adjust their behaviors. This is especially likely because in 
focus groups conducted during this period, informants from 8 of these hospitals stated that medication 
error reports were reviewed by senior managers and that their typical response was “how are we doing 
with respect to others?” If the response of participating hospitals was to initiate actions to increase the 
reporting rate in line with the regional trend, it would partly explain how the reporting trends across 
hospitals moved in tandem. This finding is important because our analysis controlled for differences in 
baseline reporting, hospital size, teaching status, and accreditation scores. 
Corrective actions taken by hospitals as a result of medication errors indicate how important 
patient safety is to the institution. First-order interventions include individual interventions such as: 
(1)  Informing staff who made the error 
(2) Informing other staff involved in the error 
(3) Providing education/training 
(4) Informing the patient’s MD 
(5) Informing the patient/caregiver 
                  (6)  Institut ing policies/procedures 
(7) Enhancing the communication process 
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Second-order interventions include system changes such as: 
(1) Computer software modified/implemented 
(2) Staffing practice/policy modified 
(3) Environment modified 
(4) Policy/procedure instituted 
(5) Formulary changed 
(6) Policy/procedure changed 
First- order interventions are aimed at individuals and are likely to have short-term effects and thus are 
unlikely to be effective in preventing future errors from occurring.  Second-order interventions involve 
system changes and are much more likely to prevent errors from reoccurring. Figure 3 shows the types 
of actions taken in response to reported medication errors.  Eighty-five percent of the actions taken by 
the hospitals in response to reported errors involved individuals.  Only 15% of the organizational 
actions involved system changes.  
A second analysis was based on a computer simulation model constructed to model medication 
error reporting and organizational changes needed to improve patient safety (Anderson et al., 2006).   
 Several potential organizational interventions were simulated (Anderson et al, 2002; 
Anderson, 2004).  First, baseline conditions were simulated. Intervention 1 involved introducing a 
basic computerized physician order entry (CPOE) system with minimal decision support for 
medication prescribing and administration.  The second intervention assumed implementation of a 
CPOE system with decision support.  Intervention 3 involved the inclusion of a clinical pharmacist on 
physician rounds who reviewed all medication orders.  The fourth intervention assumed an 
organizational commitment to undertake root-cause analyses and system changes to prevent errors 
from reoccurring.  
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Figure 4 shows the results of the simulation.  The model predicts that the introduction of a 
basic CPOE system will have little effect on the number of medication errors that could result in 
adverse drug events. Even the addition of decisio n support to the CPOE system is likely to result in 
only about a 20% reduction in medication errors. The inclusion of a clinical pharmacist on hospital 
physician rounds is like to reduce errors by only about 27%. Finally, the model predicts that when a 
commitment is made to root-cause-analysis of errors and system changes to prevent errors from 
reoccurring medication errors can be reduced by as much as 70% over time.  
Conclusions  
The results of this study carry implications for the design and assessment of data-sharing 
systems.  Organizational actions taken in response to errors indicate how aggressive the organization is 
in responding to errors.  Efforts that only affect individual staff and involve voluntary reporting and 
clinical initiatives are likely to have little effect in reducing errors long term.  System--wide 
organizational changes are essential in order to significantly reduce medical errors and adverse events.  
In general, there is a mismatch between patient safety goals and hospital actions to reduce the risk of 
future medication errors. Hospitals increasingly recognize the need to implement error reporting 
systems. At the same time they fail to implement organizational changes needed to improve patient 
safety. Actual error reduction will require organizational changes to be carefully institutionalized and 
integrated into long term plans.   
Currently only 5-10% of medical errors are reported.  There are a number of barriers that must 
be overcome in order to implement data-sharing systems designed to improve patient safety 
(Rosenthal & Booth, 2004; Ferris, 2006). First, competition inhibits provider participation.  There is a 
lack of trust of other providers.  Also, concerns about information ownership and reliability and 
privacy of data impede cooperation.  Second, there is lack of a business case for patient safety.  
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Healthcare delivery systems are complex. Implementation of information technology such as EHRs, 
electronic prescribing, clinical decision support, bar coding is expensive.  Providers do not perceive a 
return on their investment in new technology such as electronic medical records and electronic 
prescribing.   
Third, the culture of medicine presents significant barriers. Medicine is committed to 
individual professional autonomy. This results in a hierarchical authority structure and diffuse 
accountability. Furthermore, there is a culture of “blame and shame.” The fear of malpractice litigation 
inhibits reporting of errors. Fourth, there are technical barriers to implementation of data-sharing.  
There is a lack of an accepted error reporting system and standards. Also there is a lack of agreement 
of what constitutes an error.  The difficulty in identifying problems, measuring progress and 
demonstrating improvement  makes many healthcare institutions reluctant to participate in data-sharing 
coalitions. Moreover, voluntary reporting does not support comparative analysis of institutions on 
overall safety performance. What is more, the current reimbursement structure militates against 
improving safety.   
Some of the steps that need to be taken to overcome these barriers to data-sharing include 
(Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2006): 
(1)  Diffusion of safe practices such as those identified by the NQF. 
(2)  Training on safety and team work. 
(3)  Implementation of error reporting systems. 
(4)  Establish a National Patient Safety Agency similar to the one established in the UK. 
(5)  Change reimbursement policies to provide incentives to hospitals and physicians for safe care. 
(6)  Provide disincentives for unsafe practices and adverse events (e.g., Minnesota’s decision to 
stop paying hospitals for preventable adverse events).   
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(7)   Bring together the JCAHO, NQF, AHA, AMA, Leapfrog Group, the Centers of 
Medicare/Medicaid services and major payers to set explicit goals for patient safety to include 
a 90% reduction in nosocomial infections, a 50% reduction in errors associated with 
medications, and a 100% elimination of errors on NQF “Never” list.     
Leape and Berwick (2005) have observed “The primary obstacles to achieving these[improved 
safety] results for the patients who depend on physicians and health care organizations are no longer 
technical; the obstacles  lie in beliefs, intentions, cultures, and choices.” 
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Type of Error 
A:  Circumstances of events that have the capacity to cause error. 
B.  An error occurred but the error did not reach the patient. 
C:  An error occurred that reached the patient but did not cause patient harm. 
D:  An error occurred that reached the patient and required monitoring to confirm that it 
resulted in no harm to the patient and/or required intervention to preclude harm. 
E:  An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the 
patient and required intervention. 
F:  An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the 
patient and required initial or prolonged hospitalization. 
G:  An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in permanent patient harm. 
H:  An error occurred that required intervention necessary to sustain life. 
I:  An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in the patient’s death. 






















Figure 2.  Medication Errors and Organizational Changes  


































Figure 3.  Number of Organizational Actions Taken in Response to 



































§ [BL] Existing  information system  
§ [Int 1] Computer-based physician order entry system  
§ [Int 2] Computer-based physician order entry system that provides dosing information about 
drugs at the time orders are written 
§ [Int 3] Pharmacists participation on physician rounds 
§ [Int 4] Pharmacists participation and organizational commitment to identify causes of errors 




Figure 4.  Estimated Average Number of Medication Errors that 
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